CRYPTOLOG - AFTERTHOUGHTS; The Battle of Leyte Gulf

The Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines was perhaps the greatest sea battle in history. From the 23rd to the 26th of October, 1944, 282 American and Japanese warships and 190,000 men engaged in every imaginable aspect of naval warfare. The US Navy sunk four Japanese carriers, three battleships, 10 cruisers and 11 destroyers. US losses were three carriers, three destroyers and one submarine. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was pivotal. It put the Japanese Navy on it's knees and paved the way for the liberation of the Philippines.

In 1969, Commander Etta-Belle Kitchen [K] interviewed Captain Joseph J. Rochefort [R]. During those interviews, he discussed Leyte Gulf, albeit briefly. But I found it interesting and worthy of passing on. The following are excerpts of the interview transcripts. Please assume quotes in the interview paragraphs.

[R] (discussing nuances of translation) . . . One of the things that's confusing a lot of people, and it still does, I think, was the Battle of Leyte, where Kurita, (VADM Kurita, Commander First Striking Force, at Leyte Gulf) after getting into the Leyte Gulf, was in an enviable position with Halsey (ADM Halsey, Commander Third Fleet) charging out after the Japanese somewhere. In the next five minutes or so, (Kurita) could completely disrupt the whole Leyte operation. It might inflict extremely serious damage to us. He, for some unexplainable reason, reversed his course and left the area, sparing our transports and those flattops we had down there and all those people. If he had just stayed another five minutes, he could have made a shambles out of Leyte Gulf. Why did he retreat? This has been the occasion for a couple of million words, I suppose. In his original battle report that he (Kurita) sent back to Tokyo, in his original battle report, which I translated, at one time he used an expression which is very seldom used and what it actually meant is "for the time being" -- this is the actual meaning of the partial message that he sent -- that he had reversed course and headed back up toward San Bernardino Strait. He gave as his reason to the (Japanese) Navy Department, "for the time being I have reversed my course" -- this is the literal translation -- but it could be read, "I am reversing course," period. The Japanese never retreat. They might reverse, but they don't retreat . . . It was an expression you could only get if you were quite familiar with the Japanese language. You've got to read between the lines.

[K] Well, what did the effect of this have? You say if he had stayed another five minutes.

[R] If he had kept on going, he would have had an excellent chance of destroying a large number of our vessels -- people involved in the landing, and he should certainly have no problem whatever with the little Kaiser aircraft carriers (escort carriers intended primarily for antisubmarine escort duty and for transporting planes between theaters). He could have destroyed about a dozen of those. And he could have disrupted the whole operation.

[R] . . . He never expanded on it beyond that. But the crux of the translation lay in what did he mean when he said he reversed course and then these couple of groups--what did he mean? What was he talking about? Many people say that he lost his nerve. Well, this was a very stupid thing to say. In the first place, this guy had been involved in receiving attacks for the previous 48 hours -- first, by submarines; next, by Halsey's carriers -- he had been attacked for 11 consecutive hours in approaching the San Bernardino Strait by Halsey's carriers. And this was really his third day down there that this guy was under extreme pressure, so he's not chicken. But he could be mentally exhausted or physically exhausted, which is probably what happened. He was not thinking straight. . .

[R] Oh, no, no. The only difference being that he didn't destroy Admiral Kinkaid's group (VADM Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet); that was the big difference. By his actions, Admiral Kinkaid was safe.

[K] Did the American fleet -- they were not aware of his message, were they? . . .

Captain Rochefort's career in signal intelligence began when he became OIC of the Cryptographic Section, Office of Naval Communications in October 1925. His wartime contributions began with his assignment in June 1941 as OIC, Combat Intelligence Unit, Pacific Ocean Areas, located at Pearl Harbor. He retired in January 1947. He received the Legion of Merit and Navy Unit Commendation for his role in Navy signal intelligence during the war.

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AFTERTHOUGHTS

Rochefort on: The Battle of Leyte Gulf

Rochefort on:
The Battle of Leyte Gulf