CRYPTOLOG - AFTERTHOUGHTS; Pearl Harbor

Develop a mental picture of this scene: it is 3 March 1942, not quite three months since the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The stench of burned materials persists; wreckage is everywhere in various stages of cleanup; sunken battleship superstructures mark the grave sites of proud ships of the line and the men who lost their lives on them. Memories of the attack are still horrific and vivid in everyone's mind. To say that these were times of heightened intensity would be a gross understatement.

Recall from the article on Leyte Gulf that Captain Rochefort was assigned in June 1941 as OIC, Combat Intelligence Unit, Pacific Ocean Areas, located at Pearl Harbor.

Now, let's say you were in Joe Rochefort's slippers and smoking jacket [an article unto itself -- stay tuned] down in his basement lair in Pearl Harbor. And that you were working 20 hour days, rarely going home, knee deep in encrypted Japanese Navy radio messages. Your purpose in life is to provide advance information on the enemy's movements and intentions. You get lucky and manage to break a collection of messages that, given collateral information, provides solid evidence that another action involving Pearl Harbor was imminent. After notifying your points of contact at Commandant, 14th Naval District (Com 14) and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), you flop into a chair. A grin creeps on your face as you snatch a few moments for a cup of strong coffee and a pipe full of tobacco. The grin widens as you reflect on being able, this time, to warn them in advance. Then, it's back to the grind and you lose yourself in your work; all reference to time blurs.

That night, distant explosions rumble briefly through the basement, then silence. Curiosity forces you up the 'stairs' to look outside. A rain squall is ruining a moonlit night. There's activity evident, resulting from the base and ships going on General Quarters, but there's nothing amiss. After availing yourself of a half hour's worth of fresh but humid air, you drag back into the basement.

The next morning, pieces of a puzzle are put together at CINCPACFLT; you field several telephone calls; you flop back into your chair in disbelief. The Japanese did it again. Here. Pearl Harbor. Flew in, dropped bombs and departed without a scratch. Are you shaking your head?

In 1969, Commander Etta-Belle Kitchen (K) interviewed Captain Joseph J. Rochefort (R). During those interviews, he discussed this incident. The following are excerpts of the interview transcripts (assume quotes):

[R] . . . You asked a question a while back about this so-called second attack on Pearl. This, as I recall, was in February of '42 [it was 4 March 1942] and by this time, of course, we were reading partially, and from this source we received indications that the Japanese were going to conduct what I would prefer to call a reconnaissance of the Pearl Harbor area for the purpose of determining what progress we had made in repairing ships in the harbor and so on. Their idea of doing this was to send several seaplanes, which were land based, from the Marshall Islands to Pearl, and in view of the distance involved they would have to be refueled. They proposed to do this by means of submarines to refuel at some spot en route somewhere along the Midway chain. It appeared that this would be done somewhere in the vicinity of French Frigate Shoals, which had refueling facilities. The Commander in Chief Pacific was informed of this, and it developed later on some additional detailed information was also available and furnished to Admiral Nimitz's organization as well as Com 14. The planes did depart [the Marshalls], did refuel somewhere in the vicinity of French Frigate, did approach the Hawaiian Island and did circle the Islands and did actually drop a few bombs. One as I recall was in the vicinity of the Punch Bowl and departed, more or less unmolested. [Punch Bowl: extinct volcano crater, now National Cemetery near Pearl Harbor.]

[K] Now did you know they were coming ahead of time and you had told Nimitz ahead of time?

[R] We had told Nimitz and we had told Com 14 who was responsible for defense of Pearl Harbor. We had told them. I have no way of knowing whether they proceeded to act on this or whether they were not going to act. This was beyond my affairs. This was no affair of mine, except the next morning Com 14 sent for me and was quite irritated because these people had appeared and had flown more or less unmolested over the island of Oahu. It was actually incredible.

[R] I told him that this information had been furnished his office and had similarly been furnished to Commander in Chief Pacific somewhat in detail and in sufficient time for them to take any action which they wished to take. Apparently they decided to take no action. So Com 14 was apparently unaware of this information, and I never questioned, of course, what CinCPac decided to do. I was told later by informed people that the attack was made, as I say, more or less unmolested, because the Navy had no airplanes at that time capable of repelling this attack or destroying the incoming aircraft. The Army said that they only had one-place fighters, and who could expect a fighter pilot to not only fly the plane in darkness but also to approach and make an attack on any enemy plane. Therefore, nothing had been done about it, and no action was taken on this information.

[R] I just threw up my hands and said it might be a good idea to remind everybody concerned that this nation was at war. That's all I could say. I mean, I can't say any more. We can give them the information, but if they don't wish to act on it for some reason or another, this was beyond my control and it was none of my business. But the Army Air's approach to this question was completely incomprehensive to me that they could not use a multi-seat plane because it was too slow and they could not use a fighter because, while it did have the speed, these were all single-place and you couldn't expect them to do all these operation to fly and to shoot and particularly in darkness. Fortunately, as I say, no damage resulted. I think there were possibly two bombs dropped, although there was some vagueness on this also. We did not at that time, of course, develop such things as bomb recovery or have any search teams go out and find out whether these bombs were in fact Japanese or whatever they were. We had not developed that capability at all. It was just one of these things that you look on in amazement and wonder what happened.

[R] It's not a very glorious incident. You won't find very many references to this anywhere along the line.

Edwin Layton's research of the incident, conducted after the war, was published in the May 1953 issue of Naval Institute Proceedings. He located the Japanese Operations Orders and pilot reports of the mission. Facts: two seaplanes departed the Marshalls, refueled from three submarines in the vicinity of French Frigate Shoal and proceeded to Pearl Harbor. Aside from moonlight reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor, their mission included bombing the "Ten Ten Dock". The rainstorm precluded visibility of the target area; they missed their target by some six miles. A Japanese submarine, the I-23, was supposed to be stationed 10 miles south of Pearl Harbor for weather reporting; she disappeared without warning while on patrol and was not available to report or warn of the inclement weather.

Copies of this memoir and that of codebreaker Thomas Dyer are available for sale, or readers may rent copies through the lending lilbrary of the United States Naval Institute. The fee for a one-month rental is $12 for Naval Instutute members, $15 for non-members.

For orders or further information please contact Ms. Ann Hassinger, History Division, U.S. Naval Institute, 118 Maryland Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5035; telephone 410-268-6110.

AFTERTHOUGHTS

Rochefort on: The Second Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor

Rochefort on:
The Second Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor